We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined. Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle privately, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the Coase theorem holds. Despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex post inefficiencies, and the absence of incomplete information, however, going to court may be an equilibrium or ex ante Pareto-superior over settlement; this is especially true in dynamic settings whereby a court decision saves on future enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court the Coase theorem ceases to hold, and a simple rule for the initial assignment of rights maximizes net surplus. (JEL C70, K40) * Robson:
Introduction
Perhaps because the Coase theorem is not a Theorem in the mathematical sense of the term, its meaning and implications are far from being settled more than four decades after its initial formulation in Coase (1960) . For instance, Usher (1998) has recently provided an elementary scrutiny of the possible meanings of the theorem and found them wanting, as suggested by the provocative title of his article: "The Coase Theorem is Tautological, Incoherent, or Wrong." At this late date, one would expect to have such issues settled, but it is surprising how little systematic follow-up has been to Coase's own call for examining the case of positive transaction costs (see, for example, Coase, 1992 , page 717 ).
One line of research has focused on the role of incomplete information as a source of transaction costs. It is straightforward to show under such conditions that the initial assignment of property rights matters for efficiency (see for example Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; McKelvey and Page, 1998) . What is much harder to determine, however, is whether a third party with limited information -a "bumbling bureaucrat" in Farrell's (1987) terminology -can make the correct decision and pick the more efficient property rights structure. In some cases a bumbling bureaucrat can rely on simple enough pieces of information to make the correct decision, in others not. Then, other than that it depends on the particular circumstances little more can be said from such a viewpoint, a position that could be interpreted as being in favor of a weak version of the Coase theorem.
A neglected aspect of the study of property rights is that they are often costly to enforce and thus can be considered a significant component of the rarely defined and operationalized term of transaction costs. Apart from resorting to violence or the threat of it -a not uncommon form of enforcement in much of the world even nowadays -there are significant costs in securing title to assets in all economies. It is costly to enforce rights to standardized assets like real estate in developed economies, and there are even higher costs in claiming property rights on less standardized cases like intellectual property and nuisance disputes. In this paper we study the effect of enforcement costs and, in the main interpretation that we adopt, we focus on the effect of litigation costs that are incurred to secure either a better settlement or a favorable court decision. 1 To focus solely on the effects of costly enforcement, we do not allow for any income effects, incomplete information, bargaining costs, or other asymmetries. Our main assumption is that the parties are unable to commit not to engage in enforcement activities; in particular, they are unable to commit not to engage in exploratory litigation effort and other preparatory measures towards bringing a case to court. If commitment were possible and the parties could contract on the level of enforcement, then they could avoid them altogether. The assumption is thus analogous to the non-contractibility of relationship-specific investments in the theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986) . Property rights are ambiguously defined in the sense that the court's decision is uncertain, though other things being equal one party has higher probability of winning and that party is said to have the initial, ambiguously defined property right. Conditional on this initial right, enforcement efforts influence the probability of each party's winning in court.
We first examine a static model in which the two parties can engage in bargaining both before and after going to court. Bargaining and settlement involve both the sharing of a larger surplus than otherwise and the saving of some of the costs of going to court. Settling before going to court is shown then to be subgame perfect. Equilibrium enforcement efforts under such a settlement are independent of the initial assignment of property rights. When, however, the parties cannot bargain and expect to go to court, enforcement costs can be low enough that at least one party can be better off ex ante by committing not to bargain. Moreover, in such conditions, who has the initial property right matters for efficiency and a simple rule can be used to decide who should be assigned that right.
Going to court resolves all or part of the uncertainty about who has the property right. The implication, then, is that court decisions can reduce or eliminate enforcement costs in he future. With that observation in mind, we next examine dynamic versions of our model. For a wide set of conditions, we find that going to court is a subgame perfect equilibrium despite the absence of incomplete information or other complications that would be typically associated with conflictual outcomes. The parties may decide to go to court because the resolution of uncertainty about property rights saves future enforcement costs. Bargaining and settlement can still take place once derlini and Felli (2004) . Anderlini and Felli focus on the role of up-front (ex ante) costs of bargaining in sometimes foreclosing mutually beneficial exchange even in the presence of complete information. We concentrate on the role of costs that are expended during the process of bargaining and affects the bargaining outcome itself. a court decision has been made and, in such a case, a version of the Coase theorem holds. As in the static model, however, tying one's hands not to negotiate can be more efficient and also a bumbling bureaucrat could follow a simple rule for assigning the more efficient property rights structure.
The possibility of going to court under complete information is also of interest for the literature on the economics of trials. 2 To our knowledge, such a possibility has not been rigorously demonstrated in other research. The closest papers to ours are Jung et al. (1995) and Cooter (1982) . Jung et al. analyze a game of incomplete, asymmetric information in which players use valuable resources in order to influence the distribution of property rights. They obtain the result that low influence costs are less likely to be associated with Coasean bargaining. However, they consider only fixed, exogenous influence costs in their analysis, and do not explore bargaining possibilities in any great detail. Cooter, on the other hand, develops a "Hobbes Theorem" which suggests that the role of law is to minimize the inefficiencies that result when bargaining breaks down, by restricting the threats which parties can make against each other. The spirit of this result is similar to the results that we derive in the latter part of the paper. one x ∈ (0, ∞). The farmer's optimal level of x is clearly 0. Let x * denote the socially optimal level of production, so that x * = arg max x {B(x) − C(x)}. The assumptions on B(x) and C(x)ensure that such a socially optimal level of externality exists, and that it is unique. It is also straightforward to show that 0 < x * < x r ; that is, the profit-maximizing level of the rancher's activity is higher than the socially optimal level of the activity which, in turn, is higher than what the farmer would most prefer. Figure 1 illustrates one possible set of B(x) and C(x) functions that satisfy the properties we have just described.
In the absence of third-party enforcement, laws, or any norms about who has the right to choose the level of activity x, private enforcement through the threat of violence would be the typical condition. Indeed one possible logical interpretation of the Coase Theorem is that "resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of whether or not there is assignment of property rights" (Usher, 1998, p.4) and therefore private enforcement through violence would be the setting one would want to examine in order to investigate the Coase Theorem in the presence of enforcement costs. 3 However, Coase's own writings and much of the subsequent literature presupposes the existence of laws, courts, enforcement, and assignment of property rights. Therefore, in the remainder we assume the presence of these institutions, although a limiting case of our model could be interpreted to apply to the case of violence as well. 4 For our purposes here, we suppose that the parties can clarify their legal positions by going to court. To model this, we assume that the players engage in a probabilistic contest to enforce property rights, the outcome of which is ex ante uncertain. 5 The winning player in the contest is awarded the property right to choose x unilaterally. The players can influence their winning probabilities in the contest by investing in "enforcement activities", a generic term which refers to the costs of hiring of counsel and expert witnesses, payments to other legal and scientific researchers and private investigators, and other disbursements associated with the civil litigation process. Specifically, we assume that the win probabilities depend directly on these enforcement activities and obey a contest success function. 6 Let e f and e r be the amount that the farmer and the rancher invest in enforcement activities, and let ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Then the rancher's probability of winning can be described by the following function:
where f is a non-negative, continuous, increasing function, with f (0) ≥ 0. 7 Note that since p(e r , e f ) is a probability for all values of (e r , e f ), we must 4 In particular, this is the case when the parameter ϕ (defined below) takes the value of 1/2 and the contest success function (also defined below) is interpreted as a technology of conflict. For related work, see the collections of articles in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (1996) and Hirshleifer (2001) . 5 A recent example of a property-rights environment that is argued to be fundamentally uncertain is that of patents, as discussed in Lemley and Shapiro (2005) , where "[r]oughly half of all litigated patents are found to be invalid, including some of great commercial significance" (p.76). 6 The approach and functional form used here is examined in detail in the rent seeking literature, and was pioneered by Tullock (1980) . It is utilized in many different contexts other than political economy, including, for example, the analysis of R&D contests in the theory of industrial organization (Dixit (1987) ), and also in labor economics (Rosen (1986) ). 7 We make more assumptions on f later to ensure the existence and uniquenessof pure strategy equilibria. This functional form is a special case of the n-player asymmetric rent seeking contest analyzed by Gradstein (1995) . For an axiomatization of the case f(e) = e m , see Clark and Riis (1998 have that the probability of the farmer winning the contest is 1 − p(e r , e f ).
The parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of "right" that the rancher and the farmer have over the choice of x. For example assuming ϕ = 1 or ϕ = 0 represents the case in which binding legal precedent, legislation, or the facts of the case completely favor either the rancher or the farmer in gaining the unilateral right to choose x. Any other value of ϕ ∈ (0, 1) represents a situation where the legal or factual situation is not completely biased in favor of either party. Thus, we can also think of ϕ as a measure of the degree of ambiguity of property rights, or even the general "effectiveness" of the legal system, where effectiveness refers to the law's ability to generate and sustain well defined, widely applicable rules. 8 Although the nature of the true legal relationship between the parties is not completely clear at the outset, we assume that both parties know the value of ϕ with probability one. Thus, one way of thinking about ϕ is to regard it as the parties' common estimate of the true nature of the legal or factual relationship between them, given the particular characteristics of the legal environment.
We can further suppose that the ambiguity of property rights is given in the following sense: ϕ (and 1 − ϕ) can only take one of two values, ϕ 0 or 1 − ϕ 0 (where ϕ 0 > 1/2). When ϕ = ϕ 0 , then the rancher can be said to posses the (ambiguous) property right to set x, and when ϕ = 1−ϕ 0 it is the farmer who can be said to possess the (ambiguous) right to set x. The level of ϕ 0 should be considered to be beyond the control of government officials and, of course, beyond the control of the parties involved in the dispute. It is supposed to be part of the legal system that can be changed only through major changes in governance. However, the particular assignment of the ambiguous right could be made by administrative decision or regulation and its ambiguity is due to the fact that such a decision can be challenged in court.
Does assigning the property right in the sense just described make a difference? If not, we would then have a version of the Coase Theorem in the (2001) by assuming that ϕ represents a legal "fault factor" orthe "advantage of having truth on one's side." Alternatively, Katz (1988) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999) (who use a function somewhat similar to ours), call ϕ the "objective merits of the case." presence of costly enforcement. If yes, the question emerges of whether a bumbling bureaucrat with minimal information at his disposal could make the right decision and assign the ambiguous property right to one party so that welfare is maximized.
We assume that both parties are risk neutral. If the parties were to go to court, then, their payoffs would be as follows:
where B r = B(x r ), C r = C(x r ),and β > 0. These payoffs require some explanation. Consider equation (2) . In the event of a rancher victory (which occurs with probability p(e r , e f )), he chooses x = x r , gains B r , and pays e r . Should the rancher lose (with probability 1 − p(e r , e f )), the farmer would choose x = 0 and the rancher's payoff is simply 0−e r = −e r . Weighting these payoffs by the appropriate win and loss probabilities gives the expression in (2). The expected payoff for the farmer is derived in a similar fashion to yield equation (3) . Finally, we should mention that the parameter β represents the additional marginal cost of actually going to court over just gearing up to go to court. 9 
Incentives to Bargain and Settle
Once a case goes to court and a decision is made about who has the right to choose x, the two parties would have the incentive to bargain over the actual choice of x. By definition, the total surplus is maximized at x * and has a value of S * = B(x * ) − C(x * ). If the rancher were to win the right to choose x, he could be induced to choose that level x * instead of his privately optimal level x r in exchange for a large enough transfer from the farmer. Similarly, if the farmer were to be granted the right to choose x, a large enough transfer from the farmer could make him choose x * instead of his optimal level of 0.
Whereas the surplus-maximizing choice of x provides incentives for ex post bargaining -for bargaining once a court decision has been made -there are also incentives for bargaining before going to court, as going to court entails additional costs. For this ex ante bargaining to take place and lead to a settlement that avoids the costs of going to court, the two parties would obviously have to agree on a choice of x, which we can assume to be the surplus-maximizing one, and on a transfer from one party to another that deters both parties from going to court. Clearly, with the two parties bargaining and settling, the going-to-court payoff functions in (2) and (3) would be inappropriate. To arrive at the appropriate definition of the payoff functions when bargaining and settlement are allowed and to further clarify the environment we are examining, there are four distinct stages in the game:
1. Both parties choose initial enforcement efforts e r and e f .
2. The parties negotiate in the shadow of the court and possibly settle.
3. If no settlement takes place, the case goes to court and the parties expend βe r and βe f resources on litigation.
4. Given the court's decision, the parties can negotiate and settle.
We should emphasize that the level of the initial enforcement efforts, e r and e f , is non-contractible. If that were not the case, the two parties could choose to set them equal to zero and avoid all the enforcement costs. Our approach is similar to the incomplete contracts approach to the theory of the firm (see, for example, Grossman and Hart, 1986, or Hart, 1995) in which the non-contractible quantities are relationship-specific investments. Whereas in some countries and under certain conditions parties can write contracts not to sue or not to go to trial, this is by no means a universal legal practice. Moreover, even in the presence of such agreements, the parties can freely hire lawyers, explore litgation, and even engage in litigation in matters that are not directly related to the original agreements.
In each bargaining situation we follow standard practice in supposing that the outcome of bargaining depends on (i) the surplus available for division; and (ii) on the disagreement (or threat) utilities that each party has in the event that bargaining breaks down. Moreover, we suppose that the parties, given their respective disagreement utilities, split the surplus. Because there are no income effects in our setting (intentionally so), we have transferable utility, and the Pareto frontier is a straight line, this supposition appears reasonable; it coincides not only with the Nash bargaining solution but also with any other symmetric bargaining solution. 10 It is also the only bargaining outcome that would not provide one side with more exogenous bargaining power than the other.
As is evident from our discussion on the incentives to bargain above, we suppose that neither party will engage in a subgame-imperfect manner. Given that information is complete in our setting and going to court is costly, then we can expect the two parties to settle at the second stage and not go to court. The appropriate payoff functions in this case and one important property of theirs is described next.
Proposition 1 (i) The ex ante bargaining payoff functions in stage 2 are:
(ii) These same payoff functions would obtain if the stage of ex-post bargaining (stage 4) were not allowed to take place.
Unless otherwise noted, all proofs are to be found in the Appendix. The first term in each of the payoff functions represents the share of the total surplus S * received by each party. The remaining terms largely reflect the relative disagreement payoffs of the two parties and the bargaining power that emanates from that source. The higher the probability of the rancher winning (p(e r , e f ) =
ϕf (e r )
[ϕf (er)+(1−ϕ)f (e f )] ), the higher is the rancher's benefit B r , and the higher is the cost to the farmer C r , the higher is the rancher's payoff and the lower is the farmer's payoff. The costs of going to court (βe r for the rancher and βe f for the farmer) are actually shared by the two parties since bargaining takes place before the two parties incur them. As for the second part of Proposition 1, whether ex post bargaining is allowed or not does not make a difference, first, because bargaining costs are zero and, second, because transferable utility implies that the two parties can take full account in ex ante bargaining what can occur down the road.
When There is Settlement
We next examine the Nash equilibrium that emerges with the payoff functions in (4) and (5) under settlement. The following assumption is sufficient to ensure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. 11
Assumption 1: The function f is twice continuously differentiable, with f 00 ≤ 0 everywhere on its domain of definition.
In an interior equilibrium the choices of enforcement efforts (e b r , e b f ) satisfy the following first-order conditions:
These two equations imply:
By Assumption 1, this is possible only if the enforcement efforts of the rancher and the farmer are identical (e b r = e b f = e b ). Thus, the probability of winning of the rancher if they were to go to court (which affects the share of the total surplus received by each party) would equal ϕ, while that of the farmer would be 1 − ϕ. Does it make difference for the size of the net surplus, whether the administrator or regulator initially assigns the (ambiguous) right to choose x to the rancher (ϕ = ϕ 0 ) or the farmer (ϕ = 1 − ϕ 0 )? Given that the enforcement efforts are identical in equilibrium, either of the first-order conditions in (6) or (7) implies:
Note that the term ϕ(1 − ϕ) in the left hand side of this equation equals ϕ 0 (1 − ϕ 0 ), regardless of whether ϕ = ϕ 0 or ϕ = 1− ϕ 0 . Since this is the only place that the value of ϕ enters in the determination of the equilibrium effort e b , that effort is independent of whether the rancher of farmer have been assigned the ambiguous right to choose x. Since the surplus S * is fixed, any variations in efficiency can only occur through variations in the level of enforcement efforts. Therefore, as enforcement efforts do not vary with the assignment of rights, the net surplus does not depend on the assignment of rights either.
We can compare these results to the case when there are well defined and perfectly enforceable property rights. With well defined property rights and with general functional forms assumed for the agents' preferences, the efficiency version of the Coase Theorem holds: parties will agree on an efficient allocation of resources, but because of income effects the level of x that is agreed upon can (and usually does) vary with the initial assignment of property rights. However, if quasi-linear preferences are assumed, then a special case of the Coase Theorem -the invariance version or neutrality version -also holds. The invariance or neutrality version states that agents will not only agree on an efficient allocation of resources, but, due of the absence of income effects, there is only one efficient level of x, and so it cannot possibly vary with the initial assignment of property rights. 12 The result in equation (8) 1/2, those same restrictions on preferences ensure that the invariance version will also hold even when property rights are not well defined or costless to enforce -in the sense that both enforcement efforts and the final level of x do not vary with the (ambiguous) assignment of property rights.
On the other hand, from (8) we can determine that the more ambiguous the property rights are, in the sense that the closer is ϕ 0 to 1/2, the higher are the enforcement efforts and lower is the net surplus. We summarize our findings under settlement in the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose the two parties bargain and settle before going to court. Then: (i) The rancher and the farmer choose identical enforcement efforts in equilibrium; (ii) Given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ 0 > 1/2, these efforts and the net surplus available for division between the two parties are independent of the initial assignment of rights; and (iii) The more ambiguous are property rights (the closer is ϕ 0 to 1/2), the higher are the equilibrium enforcement efforts and the lower is the net surplus.
For f (e) = e, we can analytically calculate the equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium efforts and payoffs are:
We will compare these values to others later.
Settling Versus Going to Court
Although given some initial enforcement choices and that negotiations are allowed to take place the two parties have an incentive to settle, there are 13 still reasons for examining the possibility of going to court. Would the enforcement efforts differ from those under settlement if the two parties expected to go to court and, if so, how? Does the version of the Coase theorem that appears to hold for the case of settlement continue to hold when the two parties expect to go to court? Are the ex ante equilibrium payoffs under settlement higher than those under going to court? If not, would there be a way for one or both parties to make an ex ante commitment not to go to court? Therefore, we now consider the equilibrium under the payoff functions in (2) and (3); that is, we consider the game with stages 1 and 3 only. Again, Assumption 1 guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The first order conditions for the rancher and farmer at the equilibrium (e c r , e c f ) imply:
Equating these two first order conditions yields the equilibrium condition:
where c ≡ C r /B r (= C(x r )/B(x r )), which is the ratio of social costs to benefits at the rancher optimal output x r . Note that the assumptions on B(x) and C(x) do not restrict the value of c in anyway, although of course we always have c > 0. When c > 1,the costs to the farmer exceed the benefits to the rancher and therefore the social costs exceed the benefits of the activity when the rancher chooses the activity. When c < 1, the opposite holds.
To determine how the equilibrium efforts are related to this cost benefit ratio, define g(e) ≡ f 0 (e)/f (e). Then, from equation (14) we have:
By the definition of g(e) we have:
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that f (e) is an increasing function. Therefore g is monotonically decreasing on its domain of definition. From (16) we have (17) g(e c r ) > g(e c f ) for c > 1 g(e c r ) = g(e c f ) for c = 1 g(e c r ) < g(e c f ) for c < 1 which, together with the fact that g is a decreasing function demonstrates that e c r is greater or smaller than e c f as c is smaller or greater than 1. That is, the party with relatively more at stake puts more effort in equilibrium. If the cost that the farmer is trying to avoid is greater than the benefit that the rancher will receive, then the farmer will exert greater effort. If the benefit to the rancher were to be greater than the cost the farmer would incur, then it would be the farmer who would exert higher effort. This outcome does not occur in the case of the negotiated settlement because the two parties split the costs and benefits(because of the assumption of symmetry in bargaining), thus contest prizes of the same size, and exert the same amount of enforcement effort.
The enforcement efforts of course depend on ϕ. Given that the efforts of the adversaries differ when they expect to go to court and their payoff functions exhibit an asymmetry that the settlement payoffs do not have, the next issue to examine is whether assigning the initial ambiguous property right to the rancher (ϕ = ϕ 0 ) or to the farmer (ϕ = 1 − ϕ 0 ) makes a difference. For a given ϕ,consider the net equilibrium surplus when the parties expect to go to court: The second term in this surplus is the cost of enforcement efforts. The first term represents the expected net social benefit from the choice of x. 13 Note that this first term is positive or negative depending on whether the benefit B r to the rancher is larger or smaller than the cost C r to the farmer (or, whether c is smaller or greater than 1). Thus, for given enforcement efforts this term is maximized by assigning the ambiguous right to the rancher when c < 1, and assigning to the farmer when c > 1. It turns out that the whole net surplus is also maximized when this rule of property rights assignment is followed. We state this result as part of Proposition 3 below and prove it in the Appendix. Part (i) has already been shown above.
Proposition 3 Suppose the two parties expect to go to court and their payoff functions are as described in (2) and (3). Then: (i) The party with more at stake devotes more resources to enforcement activities:
and (ii) Given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ 0 > 1/2, it is efficient to assign these rights to the party that has more at stake (to the rancher if c < 1, and to the farmer if c > 1).
The simplicity of the rule of assigning the ambiguous property right in this case makes the expectation that even a "bumbling bureaucrat" could possibly make in the right direction. 14 Although settlement does not involve the additional cost of going to court and production induces the maximal social surplus S * , going to court could still be better for one or even both parties if the costs of enforcement were to be low enough compared to those under settlement. To make welfare comparisons we will calculate enforcement efforts and equilibrium payoffs under f (e) = e and compare them to those in equations (9)- (11) . In particular, under f (e) = e, the following relations hold:
In comparing first the costs of enforcement under settlement with those under going-to-court, it should be noted that the figures in (20) should be multiplied by (1 + β) since going to court involves the additional cost of βe c i (i = r , f). That is, whereas the total costs of enforcement under settlement are 2e b , those under going-to-court equal (1 + β)(e c r + e c f ). Using (9) and (20), it is straight forward to show that settlement entails higher costs if and only if
This condition is satisfied when the value of c is sufficiently small or sufficiently large. 15 That occurs because when the effects on the two parties are sufficiently different, as they can be when going to court, both parties exert considerably lower efforts so that the additional cost of going to court can be overcome. Then, the payoffs under going-to-court in (21) and (22) could well be lower than their respective payoffs under settlement in (10) and (11) . This is indeed the case, as shown by example in the Appendix, and stated in the following result: Proposition 4 At least one party may ex ante prefer going to court over bargaining and settlement.
If one or both parties were to ex ante prefer going to court over settlement, the game would have to be modified to allow the outcome of going to court as a subgame perfect equilibrium, for once at stage 2 both parties would prefer to settle regardless of the initial choice of enforcement effort. One party could, for example, commit not to bargain in advance by a burn-the-bridges act that cuts the lines of communication. We could also think of the same outcome obtaining when the bargaining costs are sufficiently high. What could an administrator or regulator do if the only information he had were 15 In particular, it can be shown that the inequality holds when:
and when:
the cost-benefit ratio c and had no knowledge of whether the parties would go to court or not? It would be reasonable to take the weakly preferred action of assigning the ambiguous right to choose x to the party with the higher stake.
When the Future Casts its Shadow
Thus far we have examined a setting with an one-time interaction between the two parties or, trivially, as a multi-period repetition of the same exact conditions and outcomes in every period. However, once the time dimension is brought in there are non-trivial dynamic considerations that enter the picture. On the one hand, if one side has the ambiguous property right and agrees to settle, could the property right become even more atrophied in the future (see Buchanan, 1989 )? On the other hand, when a court makes a decision it strengthens the property right of the winner and, presumably,reduces or eliminates the costs of future enforcement. Such considerations might drive one or both parties to go to court. To examine such a possibility we consider a non-trivial dynamic extension of the model we have analyzed thus far. For simplicity we allow for two periods. 16 The first period involves exactly the same characteristics and stages of the static model. If the parties have not gone to court in the first period, the second period also has the same characteristics and stage of the static model. If, however, the parties have gone to court in the first period,the court's decision stands in the second period as well and the party that has won has the complete right to choose x in that period too. 17 Both parties discount the second period by the factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. We do not explicitly model the possibility that negotiation and settlement could erode 16 The main ideas are easily generalizable to a finite horizon of arbitrary length and, with appropriate modifications, to an infinite horizon. 17 We can allow for the right in the second period not to be perfectly defined, but strengthened relative to the first period, without changing the nature of the results. For example, after the court's decision in the first period, the winner's still ambiguous right in the second period could equal ϕ 00 > ϕ 0 > 1/2, where ϕ 0 is the favored party's first period right. That approach could be further generalized by allowing a greater number of periods, with each court decision refining the property right of the winner. The highest court's decision could be thought of as providing the perfectly defined property right. Thus, our approach here is equivalent to the court's decision in the first period being final or not allowing any appeals.
one's property right, but it will become clear that our findings would be, if anything, strengthened by allowing for such a possibility. Before going on, we should re-emphasize the basic assumption we have made: the initial enforcement costs in each period are non-contractible. That is, the two parties cannot write a binding contract in the first period about the level of enforcement costs they can incur in either period. Thus, enforcement costs can be eliminated in the second period only if they can be induced by a subgame perfect equilibrium, and that would be possible typically only when a court decision has unambiguously assigned property rights in the first period.
Going to Court with Ex-post Bargaining
We will first show that going to court and then bargaining and settling is a subgame perfect equilibrium under some reasonable set of conditions. In the one-period model we have seen that whether ex post bargaining can take place or not does not make a difference for ex ante bargaining (Proposition 1). In the two-period model, though, that we just outlined,the resolution of uncertainty following a court decision has implications for the future that it did not have in the one-period model. Such a decision implies that one party has gained the unambiguous right to choose x now and in the future and thus the two parties do not have to incur any enforcement costs in the second period. By contrast, if a settlement were to be reached ex ante, enforcement costs will typically have to be incurred in the second period.
Consider any (e 1 r , e 1 f ) pair of enforcements efforts that have be incurred in stage 1 of period 1. To derive the threat payoffs at stage2, we need to first examine what would occur in stage 4, once a court decision has been made. At that stage each part has paid e 1 i (for i = r, f ) in stage 1 and βe 1 i at the court stage; these costs, because they are sunk, do not play any role in ex-post bargaining. There are two possible bargaining outcomes, depending on who has won in court. If the rancher has won, the rancher's threat payoff over the two periods would be (1 + δ)B r whereas the farmer's threat payoff would be −(1 + δ)C r . Given that the surplus over the two periods is (1 + δ)S * and no enforcement costs are incurred in the second period, the split-the-surplus rule would imply the following payoffs if the rancher were to win:
If the farmer has won in court, then the threat payoffs for either party would be 0 (since the optimal choice of x for the farmer is 0 and B(0) = C(0)). The ex-post bargaining payoffs in that case would be:
. Then, expected two-period payoffs before going to court are:
and substitution from the expressions above yields:
These are the expected payoffs of going to court and, if the parties were not to go to court, they represent the threat payoffs in stage 2. To have settlement at that stage, it is necessary and sufficient that the surplus under settlement be greater than W e r + W e f = (1 + δ)S * − β(e 1 r + e 1 f ), the sum of the parties' expected payoffs of going to court. The surplus from settlement equals (1 + δ)S * minus any additional enforcement costs. Because no court costs would be incurred, there would be no additional enforcement costs in the first period. In the second period, however, the parties would face exactly the same conditions as those in the one-period model and therefore they would incur the equilibrium cost of e b each. Thus the net payoff from settlement would be (1+δ)S * −2δe b . Comparing this to the surplus of going to court and then bargaining, we determine that the parties will go to court if and only if: (25) 2δe
The two parties will thus go to court if the enforcement efforts chosen in the first period are small enough. Low marginal cost of going to court (i.e., low β ), low discounting of the future (high δ), and high one-period equilibrium efforts e b . To determine whether equilibrium efforts will ever satisfy (25) first we need to define the appropriate payoff functions. For (e 1 r , e 1 f ) combinations that satisfy (25) , the parties will go to court and engage in ex-post bargaining; otherwise, the parties will settle ex-ante and split the surplus (1 + δ)S * − 2δe b with the payoffs in (23) and (24) 
For f (e) = e, it can be shown that going-to-court occurs if and only if β 2−β < δ, or when the marginal cost of going to court is not too high and the second period is not discounted heavily. 18 This result can be shown more generally. Moreover, regardless of whether the two parties go to court,the initial assignment of property rights does not affect total enforcement efforts.
Proposition 5 Consider the two-period model, whereby going to court in the first period determines who has the property rights in both periods. Then: (i) There are combinations of costs of going to court (β) and discount factors (δ) for which going to court and settling ex post is the subgame perfect equilibrium; and (ii) Whether the two parties bargain ex post or ex ante in equilibrium, and given a level of ambiguity of property rights of ϕ 0 > 1/2, the equilibrium efforts and the net surplus available for division between the two parties are independent of the initial assignment of rights.
Going to Court Without Settlement
Even when the parties go to court, part (ii) of Proposition 5 shows that a version of the Coase theorem holds. The fact that there is settlement after the parties go to court is critical for this result, for settlement allows the . It is straightforward to show that , which in turn is equivalent to β 2−β < δ.
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two parties to split the prize that they are going after which in turn induces identical enforcement efforts in equilibrium.
There are, however, at least two potential problems with bargaining and settlement in a dynamic context. First, as mentioned earlier, any kind of bargaining -whether ex ante or ex post -would be difficult to take place without inducing some erosion of a party's property right. If for example the farmer had acquired the right to choose x but acquiesced to choose x * in exchange for some transfer from the rancher, the rancher could possibly use that choice of x as evidence against the rancher's right at some point in the future.
Second, evidence suggests that very little bargaining, if at all, takes place after court decisions are made. For example, Farnsworth (1999, at page 373) 19 "examines twenty nuisance cases and finds no bargaining after judgment in any of them; nor did the parties' lawyers believe that bargaining would have occurred if judgment had been given to the loser. The lawyers said that the possibility of such bargaining was foreclosed not by the sorts of transaction costs that usually are the subject of economic models, but by animosity between the parties and their distaste for bargaining over the rights at issue." Animosity and the use of emotions for strategic purposes has been noted by some economists (Schelling, 1960; Hirshleifer, 2001 , Chapter 10) as a commitment device. Is it possible, then, as it was in the static model that going to court could yield higher ex ante payoffs than those that allow for bargaining? To answer that question, we first define the two-period payoff functions when both parties expect to go to court: form as closely as possible to the basic formulation of the Coase theorem with zero transaction costs. This way we have been able to focus on the effect of enforcement costs. What is somewhat surprising is the possibility that going court can be an equilibrium or ex ante Pareto superior when the costs of enforcement are taken into account. That is when not only the Coase theorem does not hold, but also a very simple rule -based on the cost and benefits of the activity that produces the externality -can be used to assign the more efficient property rights structure. This optimality of a targeted assignment of property rights comes about because the absence of a negotiated settlement introduces an asymmetry in the payoffs of the two parties, which translates in different enforcement efforts. The introduction of other asymmetries in the model would similarly induce different enforcement efforts. Two types of asymmetries that could be readily introduced are differential bargaining power or a liquidity constraint for one party that limits its ability to incur enforcement costs. Despite the different enforcement efforts that would be induced, it is unclear whether simple rules for the initial assignment of property rights can be found as we have found.
